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Upstream Flows of Water: from the
Lesotho Highlands to Metropolitan
South Africa
Territorialities and Hydropolitics in Southern Africa
Yannick Rousselot
1 The aim of this article is to consider mountains as suppliers of water by using the case of
the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP) – a project of transboundary water transfer
between South  Africa  and  Lesotho,  a  mountainous, landlocked1 country  completely
surrounded  by  South  Africa.  This  project  was  launched  to  provide  water  to  the
Johannesburg metropolitan area, which serves as South Africa’s economic hub and is the 
country’s most populous area, counting 12 million of the country’s 52 million inhabitants
among its residents. The function of the LHWP is to provide irrigation but even more
importantly for urban water supply.
2 The construction of the initial infrastructures began shortly after the LHWP’s founding
treaty was signed in 1986. The project’s two most important dams, the Katse and the
Mohale, were completed in 1997 and 2002, respectively. The LHWP’s hydraulic transfers t
hat  have  already  been  built  quench  close  to  half  the  water  needs  of  the  Gauteng
administrative district, with around 900 Mm3 of water transferred each year (Blanchon,
2008).2 Hydropower infrastructures (70 MW + 110 MW) intended for Lesotho have also 
been built. The water transferred from one dam to another flows through a tunnel 80 km
long that has been dug out inside the Maloti-Drakensberg Mountains and reaches the
Johannesburg  region  after  a  500 km  journey.  When  construction  of  the  LHWP
infrastructures is completed (the tentative date is set for between 2020 and 2030), dams
will be constructed on every major waterway in Lesotho, and half of Lesotho’s hydrologic
al volume will be diverted to South Africa. Given their social and environmental impacts, 
the LHWP facilities have generated intense opposition since the early stages of  their
implementation. A large array of studies have sought to evaluate these impacts, but the
environmental impacts of the LHWP are beyond the scope of this paper and will not be
considered here. Nevertheless, the relevance of the issue should not be underestimated,
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as its influence on successive steps of the project has been significant. Among others, it
has contributed to a temporary delay in the first (1A) and second (1B) phases of the
project and to the resizing of  some parts of  the project (Devitt  and Hitchcock,  2010,
Furlong, 2006, Hitchcock, 2012, Hoover, 2001, Horta, 1995, Nüsser, 2002, 2003, Swatuk,
2010, 2015, Thamae and Pottinger, 2006, World Bank, 1996). 
3 The LHWP has to be viewed within the specific context of mutual dependence between
South African and Lesotho at both the economic and the political levels.  This project
exemplifies the powerful trend of hydraulic projects that embodied the developmental 
interests of the apartheid regime. In the post-apartheid area, those same policies have
been extended with an eye towards the democratisation of access to water in South Africa
.3 In this respect, the project was undertaken in order to ensure water availability in the
long term in the Johannesburg metropolitan area and the industrial, mining and agro-
industrial clusters of Gauteng province. Moreover, it has also been viewed as a way to
ensure financial  income for Lesotho’s political  elites  in the context  of  the decline of
international development polices. As such, the two states regard the LHWP as a “win-win
” cooperation opportunity,4 and both sides are satisfied that they stand to gain from it. 
4 Following  Swatuk  (2010,  2015)  and  Furlong  (2006),  closer  scrutiny  of  this  project’s
differentiating  effects  between  territories  would  put  into  perspective  the  LHWP’s
discourse of legitimisation. One cannot simply regard such a substantial project organised
at an interstate level as one in which there is a complete absence of any clashes between
or inside the two countries implementing it. Tensions between different social groups and
territories can be amplified or provoked by the newly established exchanges of materials,
or differentially impacted by the transfer in terms of side-effects or advantages between
and  inside  territories.  For  instance,  a comparison  between  the  Johannesburg
metropolitan scale as a recipient and the Lesotho highlands scale as a provider shows that
the  LHWP  has  had  very  diverse  social,  economic  and  political  results.  The  Lesotho
highlands have sustained most of the negative outcomes from the construction of the
LHWP infrastructures  and the  massive  withdrawal  of  its  water.  So  it  would  be  very
reductive not to try and push the analysis further, beyond a representation of this project
as a mere “win-win” cooperation between the two states, as it is commonly promoted in
the  official  statements  and  reports  from  both  countries  and  the  body  in  charge  of
implementing the project, the Lesotho Highlands Development Authority (LHDA). This is
why we intend to  analyse  the  relations  with the  LHWP in  terms of  the  conflicts  or
alliances  between  territorialities  that  have  been  reordered  as  a  result  of  the
implementation  of  this  project.  Such  an  analysis  will  allow  a  consideration  of  the
territories’ and territorialities’ differentiating processes on both sides of the transfer with
an emphasis on their hydropolitical dimensions. The interplays between hydropolitics
and territorialities in Southern Africa are the main issue of this paper.
5 After a theoretical development of the concepts of scales and territorialities as spatial
practices framing forms, a description of the hydropolitics in Southern Africa will help to
contextualise the LHWP. Finally, an analysis of the regional territorialities will serve to
demonstrate  how the  complex regional  hydropolitics  have  contributed to  amplifying
some of the differentiating process between metropolitan and mountain scales by putting
in place an extractive and exportation industry of hydraulic resources through the LHWP.
 
Upstream Flows of Water: from the Lesotho Highlands to Metropolitan South Africa
Journal of Alpine Research | Revue de géographie alpine, 103-3 | 2015
2
Scales and territorialities
6 In the light of the significant unevenness of infra- and transnational relations between
Southern  Africa’s  territories  in  terms  of  local  needs  and  availability  of  water  or  of
population  density  and  wealth,  the  region’s  complexity  requires  a  scalar  geographic
approach, even more so in the present case of transboundary hydraulic infrastructures
that modify these relations.
7 There is consensus in geography about the inherited contingency of scales as both the
product and the result of social and spatial processes (Delaney and Leitner, 1997). Moore
supports  a discursive approach to scales as  a  “representational  trope” or “discursive
framing” (2008). According to him, scales in geography have to be considered relevant
only as categories of practices and not as analytical ones. From this perspective, it is
rather the performativity of the scalar tropes that should be taken into account (Kaiser
and Nikiforova, 2008). Scales and territorialities are formed by and consist of the social
actors’ discursive and material practices, and as such they are entirely contingent and
continuously being renegotiated (Mormont, 2006). This kind of approach pertains to an
analysis of social processes in terms of framing. In the same analytical framework, scalar
hierarchies as “scalar narratives” frame social processes and determine what is to be
considered relevant or visible.
The scale is a scalar level of action and is legitimised by a specific power that was able to
build its legitimacy on this level and consequently conducts its actions of spatial
organisation by and for this scalar level. Naturalised by those actions, this scale becomes
legitimate and organises a space: It creates a territory. (Arnauld de Sartre, al., 2012: §5,
our translation)
8 This quotation puts forward the way in which a scale is formed in a territory. It could be
even more accurately tied to the notion of  territorialities.  As such it  is  necessary to
consider scales through spatial practices that work as processes of the co-production of
territorialities.
9 Agnew (1994) exposes how the hegemonic nation-state form has instituted a “territorial
trap”, in other words a specifically scalar structural frame. The transnational process of
universalisation of the nation-state form can be considered a paradigmatic case of the
historical  construction  of  a  scalar  frame.  However,  the  nation-state  scale  has  the
specificity to claim a legitimate monopoly on the configurations of territories, places,
networks and relations between scales. In other words, it claims the legitimate definition
of any and all forms of territorialities that constitute or traverse its territory. As such, the
nationalist processes should be apprehended as “rescaling” projects amidst other forms
of territorialities.
 
Scalar politics and hydropolitics
10 As political ecology approaches have sought to show (Kaika, 2003, Heynen & al .,  2006,
Linton, 2010, Swyngedouw, 2010), water is a crucial political element – a hybrid that is at
once historically constructed from social  and natural  matter and produced by social,
economic and political processes in the past and the present, while inevitably related to
hydrology. Given water’s vital significance, one cannot rule out political arbitration for its
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allocation in relation to access conditions on a given territory. A fortiori,  when such a
resource is harnessed through a hydraulic infrastructure, it implies (perhaps even more
crucially) political arbitrations for the spatial allocation of its benefits and the negative
socio-natural  outputs  it  necessarily  causes.  Therefore  resource allocation  forms
inevitably raise  major  political  stakes  in  term  of  establishing  or  reproducing
asymmetrical territorial relations.
11 In this respect, mainstream transboundary water studies are not very well-equipped to
analyse the vast array of scales impacted by this kind of a massive infrastructural project.
Those studies usually fail to grasp anything outside the thin strata of intergovernmental
relations, with the notion of “water wars” always on the horizon. From a geographical
standpoint,  it  would  be  reductive  to  settle  for  such  an  analysis  that  endorses
homogenised national  territories  and conceals  the infra-  and transnational  dynamics
(Furlong, 2006:445). 
12 Regarding those mainstream studies,  there have been critical  approaches that  utilise
inputs, for instance from the neo-Gramscian critical theories of international relations.
Other  critical  approaches,  designated  as  hydropolitics,  have  also  incorporated  some
inputs from political ecology and political geography (Molle, 2008, Mollinga, 2008, Lebel,
2006, Zeitoun and Warner, 2006). Thus, certain analytical frameworks try to show that a
cooperative situation between two state bodies implementing a transboundary project
does not necessarily imply the lack of any infra- or transnational conflicts. The Southern
African hydraulic scale will serve as an illustration of this kind of difficulty.
13 I carried out field research during the spring of 2011 (March–April) in Lesotho. It gave me
the opportunity to conduct  interviews with Lesotho’s  government officials,  executive
administrators at the LHDA and members of local NGOs involved in environmental justice
issues in the country. I was given the opportunity to go into the affected area in the
highlands  and  observe  the  LHWP  facilities  first-hand.  In  addition  to  these  field
investigations,  considerable  institutional  and  scholarly  literature  about  the  LHWP
complemented the materials needed for my research.
14 This  study  of  the  LHWP  project  is  intended  to  show  how  hydropolitical  processes’
remaking of economic, political and resource relations between different (metropolitan,
rural and mountain area) scales spatially reproduces social differentiation. The study of
the LHWP will also allow the way in which territorialities are co-producing themselves to
develop by articulating within this scalar frame the social actors’ games of rivalry or, on
the contrary, the coalition seeking to get or keep a firm grip on the hydropolitical stakes. 
 
The hydropolitical space in South Africa
15 After this short look at the theory, it is necessary to deploy the national and regional
trajectories  of  Southern  Africa  in  order  to  contextualise  the  LHWP  and  the  scalar
hydropolitics processes it has created. Hence, it is essential to look into the political,
material  and  natural  processes  that  produce  the  scales,  and  how the  scales  help  to
territorialise the hydraulic policies related to the LHWP. 
16 South  Africa  is  a  very  peculiar  territory  with  regard  to  the  geography  of  its  water
availability and needs. Gauteng province is characterised by a semi-arid climate, yet it is
the most densely populated territory in the country and also the one in which most of the
national  wealth is  concentrated :  Some  20% of  the  inhabitants  lives  in  the  Pretoria–
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Johannesburg  metropolis,  which produces  40% of the  GDP and 80% of  the  country’s
extractive  outputs.  Around 16% of  the  economic  activities  of  sub-Saharan Africa  are
situated  there.  Lesotho,  and  especially  the  Maloti-Drakensberg  mountain  range  that 
covers most of the country’s national territory, is quite another story. They benefit from
the strongest  rain  average  of  the  whole  sub-continent (Lesotho is  the  source  of  the 
biggest  rivers in Southern Africa),  even though it  has a small  population with a low
density and is mostly not industrialised.5 
 
The Lesotho Highlands Water Project’s hydraulic transfers between the Vaal and the Upper Orange-
Senqu catchment areas.
17 The geography of water in Southern Africa is defined by a radical discrepancy between its
spatial distribution and the places where it is needed most. This is why water distribution
is a very sensitive topic across the region, perhaps even more critically for South Africa.
In this respect, a historical account of the regional hydropolitics is essential in order to
denaturalise the origins of this discrepancy and inscribe it into its historical trajectory.6
18 This discrepancy between the water availability space and the most populated areas is
explained by the fact that the prevailing settlement dynamics in the country have for the
most part not been shaped by water availability at the local scale. Historically it finds its
explanation in the extractive industries’ workforce requirements, which determined the 
location of Johannesburg itself. During the colonial area, these were important settlement
factors and have continued to this day.7 
19 Swatuk (2010, 2007) and Blanchon (2003, 2008, 2009) conceive the high hydraulic policies
of the apartheid regime to have been explicitly designed as ways and means to push
forward its racist ideological agenda and to have been successful in doing so. Blanchon 
even speaks of a “hydraulic mission” that the regime appears to have pursued to protect
rural Afrikaners’ way of life because its symbolic value formed part of the allegedly “
Upstream Flows of Water: from the Lesotho Highlands to Metropolitan South Africa
Journal of Alpine Research | Revue de géographie alpine, 103-3 | 2015
5
authentic” white South African identity.8 Beyond this agenda, by systematically taming
the water resources, the very abundant hydraulic projects implemented during this era
have irreversibly altered the hydraulic landscape of the entire sub-continent. The overall
outcome of this gigantism is the “artificialisation” of most of the water catchment areas
across the country and even in Southern Africa (Blanchon, ibidem).9 
20 In the post-apartheid era, a deep shift occurred in the way South African considers its
regional neighbours in favour of a more cooperative stance. It is quite a radical shift from
the apartheid regime’s securitisation policy with regard to its regional relations. But the
significance  of  this  change  should  not  be  exaggerated,  considering  the  undisturbed
regional supremacy of South Africa in terms of its political and economic regional weight.
It has great leverage to defend its agenda against that of its neighbours. In any case,
institutional, material and social-spatial inertia relating to the hydraulic and territorial
policies of the past makes any attempt to alter the prevailing spatial configuration very
complex (Giraut, Antheaume, 2005; Blanchon, ibidem, Turton, 2005). 
21 The Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), a regional alliance, defines water 
as a central instrument for prosperity on the sub-continent. Hence the claimed aim of the
regional  hydraulic  policies  is  to  contribute  to  national  and  regional  development.  A
ccordingly the territories that are perceived to contribute more in terms of value creation
and number of inhabitants, in other words the urban and industrial scales, are prioritis
ed.10 In the context of neoliberalisation in the post-apartheid era, notably the privatis
ation of the water sector, the aforementioned “artificialisation”11 of most of the water
streams  in  South  Africa  is  translated  into competition  between  infra-state  and
transnational scales for access to water, which contributes to exacerbating the existing
socially  asymmetrical  spatial  pattern across  the  sub-continent,  especially  throughout
South Africa. The hydraulic policies from the new era actively lead to a reproduction of
the  very  heterogeneous  scalar  structuration  of  the  national  territory.  The
implementation of the LHWP has had the paradoxical effect of accentuating the already
uneven water access in the Johannesburg metropolis despite a significant increase in the 
absolute value of the volume of available water. 12 
22 This allows an understanding of how the main hydraulic projects in Southern Africa have
exacerbated  the  social  and  spatial  heterogeneity  in  the  region  by  reproducing  the
existing geographical, social and economic marginalisation of certain social groups and
territories  and  the  concentration  of  resources  in  favour  of  other  social  groups  and
territories. 
 
The LHWP – the invisible tragedies of the highlands in
the win-win narrative
23 The LHWP has peculiar significance in South Africa’s state trajectory. Simultaneously, it
falls within the “high hydraulic” policies of the 1960s and 1970s and is emblematic of a
take-over inside the apartheid regime during its final years in favour of the economic
elites: outsiders from the ultra-nationalist core of the regime taking a stance against the
securitised and racist  Prime Minister P.W.  Botha’s  agenda.  This  evolution among the
elites induced a strategic shift in the desecuritisation of the regional hydraulic policies
(Davidsen, 2006). As a result, the LHWP was conceived to provide for the water needs of
the Johannesburg metropolis, an urban and industrialised space, and no longer for rural
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Afrikaners,  as  their  predecessors had done.  The implementation of  the LHWP is  also
linked to alarmist water needs projections for this metropolis made around the same
period (Swatuk, 2010).
24 The LHWP has reshaped relations between scales and between territorialities in Southern
Africa.13 For  instance,  its  infrastructures  have  established connections  between  local
scales that had previously not been in direct relation and in so doing have put them in a
state  of  co-dependency.  For  the  requirements  of  our  analysis  of  the  hydropolitics
processes, two kinds of actors are taken into consideration: the political and economic
elites from both countries and the marginalised social groups. Those different actors are
politically  involved  in  the  implementation  of  this  project  on  behalf  of  their  own
territoriality.  Nevertheless,  these  territories  have  been  modified  in  the  process and
reproduced, in particular in their reciprocal relations. The dynamics are illustrated by
the different stances of the main actors in relation to the LHWP: the Basotho communities
of  the  Lesotho  Highlands  have  transnational  claims,  the  Lesotho  government  has
developmental nationalism,14 and South Africa has pseudo-regionalist developmentalism. 
25 For a long time, the development policy apparatus has characterised Lesotho in general
and the Highlands in particular as underdeveloped and peripheral territories stuck in
tradition (Ferguson, 1990). The country’s only recognised wealth is its natural resources.15
This view established the premise for the plan to move Lesotho’s economy towards an
extractive  sector.  The  LHWP was  conceived  from the  very  beginning  as  a  means  to
promote this transition by offering economic opportunities from which both Lesotho and
South Africa (as “partners”) would mutually benefit.  It  was conceived as a “win-win”
project: taking water from the one side, which does not have the utility for it (in terms of
value creation), in order to solve the water needs of the other (World Bank, 1998).
26 South Africa paid royalties in return for the water to the government of Lesotho, which
was supposed to contribute to the development of the Lesotho. 16 These royalties now
amount to R780 million (about 50 million euros) per year,17 equivalent to about 5% of 
Lesotho’s state income outside of taxes (GoL, 2015). The 1986 treaty dispositions provided,
among other  things, for  two parts :  firstly, a  scheme for  direct  compensation to  the
populations directly affected by the construction of the LHWP facilities (loss of villages
and  arable  lands),  and  secondly, a  development  part  designed  in  the  form  of  a  d
evelopment fund. This fund had a double mandate to help balance the finances of the
Lesotho government and to assist in the development of the regions most affected by the
construction of the new infrastructure.  Most of  the second part was conceived to be
directed towards the highlands. In fact, the development fund was massively diverted
from its initial purposes in order to feed clientelist networks of Lesotho’s members of
parliament. The misappropriation and corruption cases tied to the fund were so obvious
and systematic that  the World Bank,  following an external  audit,  had stated that  its
dissolution would be a sine qua non condition for the launch of the next phase (1B) of the
project (Matlosa, 1998). The dropping of this developmentalist part of the LHWP, while
being an essential element in its justificatory apparatus, did not lead to the World Bank
withdrawing from the project.
27 The construction of dams and other LHWP infrastructures has had a direct impact on
more than 15,000 people.18 Entire communities of the highlands were forced to abandon
their lands and their villages. Their members were relocated and their dwellings rebuilt.
During the first phase of the project,19 the resettled peoples were financially compensated
on an individual basis for the loss of their arable lands. However, these compensations
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raised other difficulties, such as the fact that they are secured for a maximum period of
50 years  and  are  not  transferrable  from one  generation  to  the  next.  Besides,  if  the
transport infrastructures for the LHWP have brought the highlands inhabitants “closer” 
to the lowlands and the capital, Maseru, and made public and commercial services more
accessible, the dams’ reservoirs have created gaps inside the territories and separated
communities that had previously been in close proximity to each other on either side of
the waterways (Manwa, 2014).
28 In subsequent phases of the project, the LHDA has tried to improve its communication
with the highlands populations over issues relating to the project’s implementation, to go
over the compensations policy once again and to establish participative processes. It has
clearly emerged that the affected populations favour the replacement of the lands lost to
LHWP facilities with other arable lands. However, very little arable land is available (only
11%) (Hitchcock, 2012: 322), notably as a result of altitude. Moreover, because of rural-
urban  migration  from  the  highlands  due  to  the  lack  of  cultivable  lands  (an  issue
exacerbated  by  the  LHWP),  most  of  the  population  is  already  concentrated  in  the
lowlands,  the  most  fertile  region in  the  country.  It  restricts  the  available  relocation
possibilities in these plains for the affected people looking to re-establish an agrarian way
of life (Scudder, 2006). The issue of resettlement proved to be very complex, since the
only available lands were to be found in the South African lowlands – in the contiguous
territories  on the  other  side  of  the  border  with  Lesotho.  In  the  context  of  the
participative policies, many of the highlands communities on the verge of being ousted
were interested in this  solution –  particularly  because,  as  we shall  see  later  on,  the
Basotho  do  not  consider  this  space  to  be  foreign  territory  but  rather  “conquered
territories” illegitimately annexed from the Basotho territory by South Africa (Coplan,
2001).
As soon as it was taken up by the people as a serious possibility, some senior LHDA
officials felt the reins of control slipping from their grasp. (Devitt & Hitchcock, 2010:82)
29 The  LHDA  officials’  rejection  of  this  possibility  is  very  important.  Indeed,  such  an
inflexible response from these actors  who felt  their  power threatened illustrates  the
importance of the project’s territorialist dimension over the possibility of resettlement.
Resettlement means a geographic and social breaking up of the highlands’ populations.
The dismantlement of their communitarian way of life was accentuated even further by
the principle of more substantial compensations for those who accepted to be relocated
farther from their place of origin (Devitt & Hitchcock, 2010:87, Matlosa, 1998). It also
resulted in weakening their political claim of exteriority from the national realm. As such
it could be understood as an attempt to “repatriate” these communities under the control
of Maseru (Devitt & Hitchcock, 2010).
30 The coalition built around the LHWP (the Lesotho and South African governments, South 
African economic elites and international financial institutions) claims the project was
intended among other things to connect the highlands to the modern world and the
global market from which they had supposedly been excluded as passive spectators. With 
this stigmatisation, the coalition is denying the fact that Basotho scalar practices exceed
Lesotho’s national territory – and for that matter, the regulatory capacities of the Lesotho
government – and are actually fully involved in the world. By justifying this repatriation
dimension, this “win-win” discourse20 allows the linking of the interested parties via the
LHWP. It aligns their interests by arguing for the common ground between both scalar
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framings:  South Africa’s  desire  to  concentrate  hydraulic  resources  in  favour of  the
Johannesburg metropolitan area and Lesotho’s territorialist purposes.
From a state scale perspective, the LHWP brings much needed revenues and electricity to
economically stressed Lesotho, supplies equally needed water for South Africa’s industrial
heartland in Gauteng, and is an exemplar of interstate water cooperation and dispute
settlement. Constraining analysis to the state scale, however, obscures the uneven
distribution of cost incurred and benefits accrued from the project. It also obscures the
complex realities of conflict and cooperation by restricting their domain to interstate
relations. (Furlong, 2006:452).
31 According to Furlong, if there is a collective that could identify itself with the “win-win”
hegemonic concept, it is a transnational elite that certainly benefits from this project.
This hypothesis makes it possible to move beyond the consensual representation of the
LHWP as  a  shared  and mutually beneficial  scheme.  It  can  be  conceived  as  a  water-
appropriation device of a “looting economy”. This point fits with the prevailing discourse
in Lesotho, especially in the highlands, that regards the LHWP as a catastrophic project
with tragic consequences for the local populations: a project that has not kept its promise
s about  the  work  and  development  that  the  construction  of  its  infrastructure was
supposed  to  bring.  From  this  viewpoint,  the  LHWP  could  be  painted  as  a  project
essentially imposed from the outside on Lesotho in order to capture the precious water
from the highlands, with only the well-being of South Africa in mind.21
32 Scudder (2006) argues that the compensations and development policies funding plan
were insufficiently formalised in the LHWP treaty. The reason was a reluctance on the
part  of  the  South African  representatives  and  the Lesotho  representatives’  lack  of
engagement on the issue. However, this indecisiveness behind the treaty’s dispositions
should be blamed for the compensations policies failures, as it left the door open to South
African  interference  in  the  developmental  dimensions  of  the  project.  Therefore,  the 
blame for the issues arising from those policies should not be laid too quickly at the door
of the LHDA or the Lesotho government’s “institutional weaknesses”, as the World Bank
seems to allege (World Bank, 1998).22 A factor that could explain these difficulties is the
reluctance of the signatory states to commit financially to the development components
of the LHWP. This reluctance reveals the lack of interest of both the Lesotho and South 
African negotiators in the politically and symbolically marginalised populations of the h
ighlands.
 
Results: controversies and conflicts of territorialities 
33 The main hypothesis of this study of the LHWP is that water has to be conceived of as a
stake and a  means of  production and/or reproduction of  scalar  practices,  namely of
territorialities. Thus the LHWP is to be analysed as a material and discursive assemblage
that  brings  together  three  distinctive  types  of  territorialities.  Firstly,  the  Lesotho
nationalist territoriality seeks to monopolise any social and spatial processes in favour of
the  national  scale.  Secondly,  the  Basotho  communities  claim  autonomous  and
transnational  territoriality  as  the  proper  scale  of  their  daily  practices  against  the
interference of Lesotho and South Africa and expect their transboundary practices to be
unencumbered by borders  and the bureaucracy they entail.  Finally,  the territoriality
borne by the South African political and economic elites consists of a vast process of
natural and economic resource concentration geared toward the “thirsty” Johannesburg
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metropolitan area to the detriment of the allegedly less productive scales (townships,
rural areas, mountains, etc.).
34 It appears that the Lesotho government, via the LHWP, is attempting to “repatriate” the h
ighlands  communities,  in  other  words  to  impose  the  nation-state  scale  on  these
populations  despite  their  own  territorial  allegiances.  In  order  to  undertake  this
repatriation project, a stigmatising discourse was required, and the depiction of the h
ighlands as traditional and outside the modern world was a way to perform this marginali
sation. It also converged with the economism that has defined the LHWP from the outset.
It justified a miserabilism regarding the highlands, notably by considering their usage of
water to be unproductive because the Basotho were not valorising it to a significantly
economical extent. This representation adds to a long-time blindness concerning Lesotho
(Ferguson,  1990)  and especially its  highlands.  It  legitimised this  massive intervention
inside its territory in the name of modernisation. While the spatial practices of these 
populations are quite modern, they are problematised by the state because they largely
slip out its  control  (except for the small  interference created by bureaucratic border
obstacles) (Coplan, 2001). Thus, this relative deterritorialisation, which relegates them to
being marginalised territories requiring repatriation, was intended to justify forcing the
jurisdiction of the state onto the highlands in the name of developing and modernising
them. This nationalist scalar attempt was allegedly pursued for the common good. But t
he  LHWP  has  incidentally  performed  a  reterritorialisation inside  the  national  state
territory by making the redeployment of the state apparatus a financial and material
possibility. Until then, state facilities were mostly concentrated in the country’s lowlands.
The extension of the state presence in the highlands had been impossible before because
of the weak means of the state and because this territory had no roads.23 It seems that this
had been one of the Lesotho government’s main aims with regard to the LHWP, much
more so than any attempt to break up an alleged traditionalist and autarkic territory. And
it has been perceived as such by the Basotho populations (Thamae and Pottinger, 2006).24
35 The Basotho claim their territory on cultural grounds: a majority of Basotho speakers
inhabit this territory where the Sesotho culture prevails. They also claim it on a historical
basis.  Its  South African side  was  conquered by the Boers  during the Boer  Wars  and
subsequently annexed by South Africa, which is why they call it “conquered territories”.
This transnational territory in which they carry out their daily practices spreads to South
Africa,  far  wider  than  the  Lesotho  national  territory  itself.  At  the centre  of  their
territorial practices, in terms of work, access to commodities and services and even of
children’s schooling, the border with South Africa is better described as a passage way
than a boundary. In relation to this scale, the highlands are far from marginal: On the
contrary, it constitutes the heart of this territory claimed by the Basotho (Coplan, 2001).
36 The  latter  have  experienced  the  LHWP  as  a  major  intrusion  on  their  territory,
particularly  because  it  was designed  by  two  authorities  perceived  as  “foreign”. 
Furthermore, it is conceived as a violation, given that the two signatory parties of the
LHWP treaty (South Africa’s  apartheid  regime and Lesotho’s  military  junta)  are  now 
viewed as illegitimate.25 It has been perceived as a means for the state, from its base in the
capital, Maseru, to have direct influence on the “hinterland” that, until then, had been
relatively autonomous. This agenda has provoked reactions in the form of daily violence
against the convoys for the construction of the LHWP’s infrastructures in the highlands, 
including stones being thrown, insults hurled and other altercations (Scudder, 2006).
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37 The LHWP’s  facilities  have also  been targeted for  their  symbolic  value during major
political  mobilisations  in  Lesotho.  These  uprisings have systematically  been violently
repressed. The culmination occurred in 1998, when during an uprising throughout the
country,  opponents  of  the  ruling  government  in  Maseru  invaded  the  Katse  Dam’s
facilities. South Africa intervened militarily in Maseru and at the Katse Dam, under legal
jurisdiction from SADC, to protect the facilities of the LHWP, which resulted in the deaths
of more than 100 people and heavy damage in Maseru.
 
Conclusion
38 The implementation of the LHWP has led to a reassemblage of different territorialities,
allowing South African to concentrate its resources in favour of the metropolitan scale
and  the  Lesotho  government  to (re-) establish its  national  territory  as  the  scale  of
practices for the Basotho populations of the highlands. These two territorialities have
tended to reinforce each other at the same time as they followed a trajectory in conflict
with the Basotho territoriality. It has ignited internal clashes in Lesotho and a deepening
of social and spatial inequalities in Maseru and the highlands. Thus it has fuelled political
instability, which has manifested as major uprisings. South Africa’s military intervention
in Lesotho in 1998 is significant, as it demonstrates the convergence of South Africa’s 
scalar project and the one from the side of Lesotho. This event evinced how the interest
of South Africa to secure the LHWP facilities in order to ensure Johannesburg’s water
supply coincided with the interest of the Lesotho government to have the threatening
political movement repressed. The territorialities of South Africa and Lesotho, as much as
that of the Basotho, have been reworked by the emergence of this new transnational
assemblage in their reciprocal relationships and in relation to this new scale. The LHWP
not only amplified the differentiation between metropolitan and mountain scales but also
exacerbated the  social  and  political  tensions  resulting  from  the  ever  more  blatant
inequalities characterising the post-apartheid era. 
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NOTES
1. Over 80% of the country lies more than 1,800 m above sea level (see the map).
2. “[W]hether it will be thanks to later phases of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project or other
similar projects implemented entirely on South African territory. In total, 2,200 Mm3 per year
will be extracted from the river” (Blanchon, 2003:29, our translation).
3. “In  the  apartheid  era,  dominant  actors  justified  harnessing  water  in  terms  of  economic
development, building of the ‘modern Western state’, and keeping white South Africa safe from
communism and the ‘black peril’. The dominant actors of the post-apartheid era have altered
this narrative: harnessing water for economic development, poverty alleviation and justice for all
” (Swatuk, 2010: 522).
4. “[In the words of South African President Thabo Mbeki,] the economic destinies of our people
and countries are inextricably linked together ... the Lesotho Highlands Water Project [has] great
potential  to  bring  long-term  benefits  that  could  be  shared  by  both  countries” (Davidsen,
2006:123). “The Treaty also involves hydropower generation for Lesotho on the basis of royalties
from South Africa for the next 50 years, making water ‘Lesotho’s White Gold’, creating a win-win
situation for both countries” (Quoted in Davidsen, 2006: 50).
5. (Grundling et al., 2015: 1, Gupta et al.: 2008, Nüsser, 2003: 24).
6. “The  history  of  the  region  has  also  resulted  in  a  situation  whereby  Southern  Africa’s
geography of water use is virtually the inverse of its geography of water availability. [...W]hile
possessing only 10% of Southern Africa’s total water resources and one third of its population,
South Africa is responsible for 80% of the region’s water consumption.” (Furlong, 2006:447).
7. “From a dusty, ad hoc settlement developed around mining in Johannesburg's population had
grown to a quarter of a million by 1914” (Swatuk, 2010: 528).
8. “In southern Africa, [...] government officials exercise their political and technological power
to marshal water resources for use by white farmers, a process that reinforced the social and
political hegemon of the state and of the white settler elite” (Forrest, 2006:151).
9. “Ce ‘complexe hydropolitique’ constitue un espace d’ampleur subcontinentale, où la plupart
des  bassins  versants  sont  interconnectés,  où  toute  action  sur  l’un  des  hydrosystèmes  a  des
conséquences sur l’ensemble du réseau et dans lequel la notion même de bassin-versant perd de
sa pertinence.” (Blanchon, 2008:67).
10. The balancing of interests in demographic and demographic terms, which implies an evaluat
ion of the respective contribution of each scale to the common good (conceived as prosperity for
the many), may very well be consistent. However, the use of GDP to justify this arbitration –
while  this  indicator  is  known  for  its  homogenising  disposition  regarding  economic  national
territories – tends to veil the very same effects those policies would have, such as amplifying
social and economic disparities inside and between territories and accentuating the marginalis
ation of rural and mountain areas.
11. “La direction anthropique de l’eau (l’argent et le pouvoir), l’emporte de plus en plus sur la
direction naturelle” (Blanchon, 2009: 117).
12. “In Johannesburg where the water is being received, it is mainly directed to already well-
served high-income areas. In fact, due to the project’s high cost combined with user-pay full-cost
recovery  policies  for  water  services,  the  project  has  actually  hindered  water  access  for
Johannesburg’s urban poor” (Furlong, 2006: 453).
13. “The situation of interbasin water transfer schemes is more complex, since a transfer implies
an increase of the spatial scale at which water is managed. Connecting physically two river basins
implies a discontinuity […] socially a new connection is established between communities that
hitherto did not depend on each other, at least not in terms of water” (Gupta, al, 2008: 37).
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14. “[The LHWP] depends on the central government, for the good of the whole nation! [...] it’s a
national project for the benefit of the whole country”. Extract from an interview conducted by
the author with the executive manager of the chieftainship directorate at the Ministry of Local 
Government and Chieftainship Affairs, Maseru, Lesotho, 2011.
15. At  the  same  time,  however,  Lesotho  is  an  important  pool  of  labour  for  South Africa’s 
extractive sector, and a significant part of Lesotho’s GDP comes from its migrant workers.
16. This appropriation of a resource in return to royalties paid out to Lesotho can be conceived as
a commodification of the highlands water.
17. Reference: fiscal year 2015–16 (GoL, 2015).
18. “The total project-affected population for the first two phases (IA and 1B) was estimated at
15,800” (World Bank, 1996:10).
19. Phase 1A of construction of the roads required access to the infrastructures’ construction
sites, for the Katse Dam and the transfer tunnel through the Maloti-Drakensberg.
20. “By contrasting ‘water-rich’ and economic poor Lesotho with “water-poor” and economic
rich South Africa and by further claiming that the LHWP will create a win-win situation for both
countries ‘which would both be losers otherwise’ puts an irresistible offer on the negotiating
table” (Davidsen, 2006:125).
21. “The  ordinary  Basotho  citizens  are  not  gaining  any  benefits  from  the  current  relations
between the two countries. If anything, they argue, Basotho are forced into conditions of untold
poverty and destitution by the country’s nominal independence which benefits the political and
bureaucratic elite.” (Kapa, 2007: 130).
22. The  World  Bank  uses  the  “failed  states” rhetoric  symptomatic  of  international  financial
institutions’ liberal dogma (Ferguson, 1990).
23. The Lesotho government would not have had the technical or financial means to extend its
own bureaucratic apparatus.  Neither would it  have had the means to improve the roads and
other infrastructures on the whole territory it claims without external resources. 
24. An over-coding process of the highlands territory already raised by James Ferguson in his
study of a rural development project implemented in the 1970s in the same Taba-Tsake region as 
the LHWP (Ferguson, 1990).
25. According to these critical stances and many actors interviewed on site, the LHWP would still
be to a large extent the heir of the authoritarian regime that launched the LHWP.
ABSTRACTS
The aim of  this  article  is  to  consider  the mountains  of  Lesotho as suppliers  of  water to  the
Gauteng metropolitan area in South Africa. By analysing the hydropolitics of the Southern Africa
n region in the context of politics of scale, the focus is on the Lesotho Highlands Water Project
(LHWP), a transboundary water transfer project between Lesotho and South Africa. The goal is to
link  hydropolitics  with  territorialities.  The  LHWP  has  resulted  in  a  reproduction  of  the 
asymmetrical  relations  between  and  inside  the  metropolitan  and  mountain  areas  of  both
countries.  Coalitions  of  actors  have  emerged from these  new relations  that the  transfer  has
produced, and as such, this project should be analysed as a hydraulic assemblage in which three
distinct scales of territorialities are clashing or cooperating with each other: the regional scale,
made up of South Africa’s political and economic elites, who seek to direct Southern Africa’s
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water resources towards the thirsty region in and around Johannesburg; the scale of the Lesotho
government, which has a nationalist policy of monopolising any social and spatial stakes for the
benefit  of  the national territory;  and the scale of the Maloti  communities,  which claim their
rights as a transnational Basotho nation and autonomy in the face of interventionism from the
Lesotho state.
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